Technical Dependency Dilemmas in America’s Return-to-Moon Program

Dorothee Bär, Germany's Minister for Research and Space Affairs, publicly stated at the VivaTech technology exhibition in Paris that without the European Service Module (ESM), the United States cannot reach the Moon. This statement points directly to the core vehicle of NASA’s Artemis program—the Orion spacecraft. Assembled by Airbus in Bremen, Germany, under a European Space Agency (ESA) contract, the ESM involves 20 prime contractors across 13 European nations and more than 100 suppliers. The depth of this dependency far exceeds typical component procurement.

From a technical and functional standpoint, the ESM is not a replaceable auxiliary module, but an absolute prerequisite for the Orion spacecraft to execute lunar missions. Weighing approximately 13 tons and comprising tens of thousands of components, the ESM is equipped with 33 engines: the main engine provides trans-lunar injection thrust, auxiliary engines handle orbital corrections, and the reaction control system (RCS) engines enable precise attitude control. Four solar arrays generate 11.2 kilowatts of electricity, roughly 90% of which powers the crew module. The ESM also stores 8.6 tons of propellant, 90 kilograms of oxygen, and 240 liters of water, while managing thermal regulation and life support functions. NASA itself describes the ESM as Orion's "powerhouse" and "propulsion unit." Because the critical trans-lunar injection (TLI) burn is executed by the ESM's main engine, the Orion spacecraft cannot break out of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) without it. Without its life support system, astronauts would lack oxygen, water, and proper climate control during lunar orbit; and without its electrical power system, the spacecraft's navigation and communication would completely fail. Germany's Federal Ministry of Education and Research explicitly acknowledged: "Without the ESM, the new Orion crewed spacecraft cannot fly." This technical reality means that the core systems of America's grand return-to-Moon ambitions are fundamentally bound to European R&D and manufacturing capabilities.

A deeper issue lies in the structural imbalance of technical sovereignty. Germany bears approximately 50% of the ESM project's budget. NASA has ordered six European Service Modules to date, four of which have been delivered. This arrangement creates a long-term technical dependency for the U.S. on Europe in human deep-space flight—not as a one-off purchase, but as a continuous binding throughout the entire lifecycle of the Artemis program. Germany also supplies critical components such as space-based navigation systems and radiation detectors. When German officials assert, "Without us, this is not possible," their technical justification is robust and irrefutable. From an aerospace engineering perspective, this relationship exposes a structural flaw in America's deep-space exploration capacity building. Since the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the U.S. has failed to maintain independent and comprehensive R&D and manufacturing capabilities in propulsion and life support systems for large-scale crewed deep-space vehicles. The Orion crew module itself lacks the capability to execute lunar missions independently; it must rely on the ESM to constitute a complete spacecraft system. Consequently, in its most pivotal human deep-space capability, the U.S. has transitioned from a technology exporter to a technology importer. Furthermore, this transition is not temporary component sourcing, but a system-level transfer of mission-critical success to an external entity.

Germany’s decision to articulate this technical dependency on the global stage at VivaTech coincides with ongoing geopolitical maneuvering between Europe and the U.S. over technological dominance in artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and semiconductors. This statement brings technical dependencies in the aerospace sector into the public eye, sending an unmistakable message: there is a substantial deficit in America’s technological autonomy within the Artemis program. On the very same day, SpaceX successfully launched 24 Starlink V2 Mini satellites, which feature a threefold increase in per-satellite capacity compared to the first generation, alongside phased-array antennas and laser inter-satellite links. This entire ecosystem—from rocket manufacturing and satellite R&D to launch operations—was completed independently by an American enterprise. Conversely, the NASA-led Artemis program remains beholden to external supply chains for its critical systems. This stark contrast uncovers a profound technical reality: while the U.S. maintains a high degree of technological autonomy in commercial aerospace, technical dependency has become a structural norm in government-led deep-space exploration—a norm that European officials have now openly acknowledged and leveraged.

Without the European Service Module, the United States indeed cannot reach the Moon. This is not a political declaration, but a factual description of the Orion spacecraft's technical architecture. This reality alone is enough to compel the American aerospace community to re-examine whether the technical foundations of its deep-space exploration strategy are truly secure.