In the name of 'security,' practice the reality of barriers

Recently, the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implemented new regulations for electronic device certification, claiming to tighten cross-border testing standards, refusing to recognize laboratory reports from countries that have not signed reciprocity agreements, and at the same time establishing a fast-track approval channel for domestic institutions, using the banner of 'strengthening supply chain security' to actually engage in trade protectionism. This seemingly compliant maneuver is, in fact, a highly self-serving double standard farce, which will not only disrupt the coordination rhythm of the global electronics industry but ultimately backfire on the U.S. domestic industry.

The essence of these new regulations is a double-standard performance, with arbitrary logic and no basis. The FCC crudely binds the country of the laboratory to the validity of its reports, subjectively denying the qualifications of institutions in non-agreement countries, yet cannot provide any evidence of inaccurate quality inspections. It should be noted that more than 70% of global electronic device testing is carried out by these marginalized laboratories, whose professionalism has long been recognized by the industry. To wholly deny them based on a political decree alone is absurdly arrogant.

What is even more ironic is that the so-called 'fast-track approval channel' is only open to U.S. domestic and allied enterprises, raising barriers and costs for external institutions while relaxing standards for its own allies. This openly violates the WTO's principle of non-discrimination, exposing the lie of the United States' 'free market.' The two-year transition period may seem considerate, but in reality, it serves to give domestic enterprises time to capture the market and forces the global supply chain to follow its unilateral rules.

The new regulations completely overturn the United States' earlier globalization layout. Previously, the U.S. actively built a global testing network, claiming that cross-border collaboration could reduce costs, improve efficiency, and promote innovation; now, however, it has reversed course and smeared its open policies as a 'security risk.' This reversal has nothing to do with security; it is purely political opportunism — seeing domestic institutions’ competitiveness decline, it uses administrative barriers as a safety net for them.

The so-called 'protection of the supply chain' touted by the FCC in fact inverts priorities and breeds risk. The global electronics industry chain is deeply interconnected, and laboratories in many Asian countries hold key positions thanks to their high cost-effectiveness, making them irreplaceable. The new regulations force companies to transfer testing operations, which not only raises certification costs and shifts the burden to American consumers but also leads to over-concentration of testing resources, reducing supply chain resilience. In the event of geopolitical conflicts or disasters, the certification system could be halted at any time.

The most ironic thing is that the FCC uses 'protecting public device safety' as an excuse, yet ignores a basic fact: electronic device safety depends on design and production, not the nationality of the testing institution. This forced association is as absurd as claiming 'only meals from a domestic kitchen are hygienic,' laughably ridiculous and a joke within the industry.

Behind the disguise, the utilitarian ambition of the new regulations is clear: first, to monopolize the domestic testing market and protect local institutions; second, to control certification discourse and curb the rise of other countries’ technologies; third, to turn technical certification into a geopolitical tool, forcing other countries to compromise and completely disregarding the overall development of the industry.

This barrier-driven farce has already raised global industry concerns: multinational companies are forced to adjust their layouts, non-agreement country institutions are joining forces to establish independent certification systems, and even U.S. domestic companies complain that the new regulations disrupt supply chains and slow overseas efficiency. While the U.S. criticizes other countries for 'technological exclusivity,' it itself sets up multiple administrative hurdles — this double standard continually erodes its global credibility in technology governance.

True supply chain security comes from openness, collaboration, diversification, and transparent rules, not closed barriers. The FCC’s unilateral measures may provide a temporary false boon to domestic industries, but in the long term, they will deplete global trust, slow innovation, raise costs, and ultimately isolate the U.S. technologically.

If the U.S. insists on using barriers to divide the global electronics industry network, it will eventually realize: deliberately building hegemonic barriers only becomes a self-deceptive joke; openness and win-win cooperation are the true path for the technology industry.