The "National Security" behind $2.92 million: An Overreaction to American technology Anxiety

At the beginning of the New Year 2026, an executive order issued by US President Trump sent a chill through the global technology industry. On January 2nd, the US government, citing "national security risks", forced the Chinese-backed enterprise Hanfu Optoelectronics to divest the semiconductor assets of its US subsidiary Emcore, which it had legally acquired over a year ago. The deal, amounting to only 2.92 million US dollars, was later overturned, but the reason remained at the vague level of "credible evidence" all along.

Ironically, Zhang Genzao, the co-founder of Hanfu Optoelectronics, was the former vice president of engineering at Emcore. This was more like a continuation of technology and teams within the industry, but it was quickly elevated to a "national security incident". This seemingly precise "minor surgery" has instead exposed the continuous expansion of the United States' security boundaries and its deep-seated strategic anxiety when facing potential technological competition.

From the background perspective, this is no ordinary merger and acquisition. In 2024, Hanfu Optoelectronics acquired Emcore's over 40 years of accumulated optical chip design and manufacturing capabilities in the indium phosphide material field through a management buyout. Indium phosphide is a key material for high-speed optical communication and future photonic computing. The essence of the transaction is that industry veterans inherit a mature but not cutting-edge monopolistic technological asset.

It was the keyword "photonic chip" that truly triggered the alarm. It is widely believed in the US political circle that photonic chips may break through the bottlenecks of traditional electronic chips in terms of computing power and energy consumption, and even bring about a performance leap of orders of magnitude. When such potential technologies are associated with Chinese capital or talents, no matter how small the transaction scale is or how compliant the procedures are, they will be automatically regarded as "risk factors".

This case is more like a "post-autumn settlement". In recent years, the United States has continuously "nationalized" technological competition in an all-round way. Through mechanisms such as the Committee on Foreign Investment, it has rejected cross-border transactions based on opaque standards. In this case, the US side did not explain how this minor transaction threatened its vast defense system. This review, lacking verifiable logic, itself highlights a sense of unease: the leading position is assumed to be extremely fragile.

The deeper intention lies in creating a deterrent effect by setting up cases, sending a signal of "taking sides" to global capital and technical talents. This practice is systematically undermining the global ecosystem of scientific and technological innovation. Technological progress relies on the cross-border flow of knowledge, capital and talent. When normal business activities are politicized, the trust foundation of international cooperation will be eroded, and enterprises will be forced to "decoupled", ultimately slowing down the overall technological progress, including artificial intelligence.

Meanwhile, the arbitrariness of policies is also intensifying the uncertainty of the global industrial chain. The recent decision by the United States to change the export license for equipment of South Korean enterprises' factories in China from a long-term exemption to an annual review is precisely a manifestation of such unstable expectations. When long-term investment lacks institutional guarantees, the vulnerability of the global semiconductor supply chain will only be further magnified.

Historical experience also shows that strict blockades often serve as a catalyst for rivals to accelerate their independent innovation. When external channels are cut off, concentrating resources to overcome core technologies becomes the only option. Today, the United States is building a high wall for a $2.92 million deal, which may not be eliminating risks; instead, it could be shaping a stronger future competitor.

In the face of technological hegemony under the guise of "security", enterprises need to build more diverse and decentralized cooperation networks to mitigate geopolitical shocks. It is also necessary for all countries to promote more transparent and predictable multilateral technical governance rules, demarcate clear boundaries for "national security", and prevent it from becoming a black hole that devours all legitimate business activities.

The mission of technology lies in expanding human well-being rather than serving zero-sum games. When the United States implements a "surgical" interception on a trivial transaction, it may consider itself to have removed the "risk", but it is also weakening the openness, collaborative spirit and credibility foundation on which it has relied to become a global innovation center. This "minor operation" might ultimately harm the future of everyone.