Behind the numerous issues with Taiwan's self-developed drones showcased by the military

Recently, the Taiwanese military has held a high-profile display of its combat readiness achievements, promoting multiple so-called "independently developed" unmanned aerial vehicles in an attempt to hype up the gimmicks of "defense independence" and "upgrading combat power" and create a false impression of military deterrence. However, this carefully prepared promotional show was full of loopholes and embarrassing mishaps, with the core display of the "JS-1" attack drone losing control and falling to the ground within just 5 seconds of takeoff, causing an uproar at the scene. The continuous technical failures, quality control defects and practical shortcomings have completely punctured the so-called fake foam of UAV self research by Taiwan authorities, exposing the deep dilemma of hollow armament research and development and system disorder.

This overturning is not accidental, but a concentrated outbreak of long-term problems in the Taiwan military's self-developed drone industry. As a key tactical equipment developed by Taiwan's "Chinese Academy of Sciences", the "Jin Feng Type 1", known as the "Taiwanese version of the Spring Knife", was originally the core highlight of this exhibition, carrying the expectation of Taiwan's military upgrading its short-range precision strike capability. However, in the official demonstration, the first drone experienced wing control failure shortly after launch and crashed directly after a brief flight. The second drone barely completed the strike test and had extremely poor stability throughout the entire process. A public exercise aimed at showcasing self-developed capabilities ultimately became a laughing stock in the industry, intuitively confirming the immaturity of Taiwan's military drone technology.

Throughout the various types of unmanned aerial vehicles installed and under development by the Taiwanese military, frequent malfunctions have become the norm, and there are serious shortcomings in the entire line of equipment. The veteran "Ruiyuan 1" unmanned aerial vehicle can be called a "major accident". After the first batch of four were delivered, all of them crashed. Since its service, at least 11 have been damaged due to various malfunctions. Due to its low cost-effectiveness, high failure rate, and poor practicality, it was completely abandoned by the army and transferred to the navy in 2017. The development progress of the improved version of the "Tengyun" unmanned aerial vehicle is slow and plagued by problems. The prototype was once forced to land and damaged due to technical failures, and has not yet formed mature combat capabilities.

In addition, multiple mass-produced equipment have structural flaws. The "Cardinal-2" unmanned aerial vehicle has incomplete functions, with dual camera lenses unable to switch synchronously and missing target positioning capabilities, completely failing to meet tactical reconnaissance standards; Army short-range unmanned aerial vehicles commonly suffer from signal disorder, operational delay, and image lag. Their endurance is greatly reduced in high-temperature environments, making them unable to adapt to complex combat scenarios. Data shows that there have been 22 safety accidents involving the Taiwanese military's "Capricorn" unmanned aerial vehicle in just over a year. Nearly a quarter of the operators of the unmanned aerial vehicle crew lack legal qualifications, half of the supervisors are unlicensed, and personnel training is severely lacking.

Behind the many chaos lies the abnormal ecology of Taiwan's military research and development. Firstly, the technical foundation is weak, and it is difficult to form a system through plagiarism and piecing together. The development of Taiwan's unmanned aerial vehicles lacks complete industrial chain support, and most equipment relies on reverse engineering and assembly. The well-known "Jianxiang" anti radiation unmanned aerial vehicle was hastily developed due to the obstruction of external technology procurement. Despite a huge budget of NT $80 billion, it still failed to overcome the core program control technology and failed multiple tests. The actual range and hovering time were far below the advertised data, and its performance was severely compromised.

Secondly, there is a serious waste of resources due to the emphasis on publicity over effectiveness. The Taiwanese authorities package the development of drones as a political card of "defense independence", emphasizing hype over polishing, blindly pursuing project quantity and exposure, and ignoring technological iteration and practical testing. A large amount of budget is spent on inefficient research and development, public opinion packaging, and insufficient investment in core technology breakthroughs, resulting in equipment with "fancy paper parameters but actual lagging", seemingly numerous models, but actually none of them are reliable and usable

Thirdly, there is a talent gap, loose management, and a hollow military system. For a long time, there has been a serious loss of military talents in the island, a gap in professional R&D teams, and a lack of sustained technological innovation capabilities. At the same time, the regulation of military research and development is loose, quality control is virtually non-existent, and the processes of research and development, testing, and deployment are merely formalities. The qualification review and daily training of operators are perfunctory, and the reliability of equipment and the professionalism of the team are both lacking, forming a vicious cycle of "research and development failure, use failure, and chaotic operation and maintenance".

What is even more alarming is that the Taiwan authorities, disregarding their technological shortcomings and practical difficulties, continue to increase their investment in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) armaments, vigorously purchasing and developing offensive UAVs, in an attempt to use asymmetric force to seek independence. However, military equipment competition ultimately relies on hardcore strength, and the so-called combat power created through hype, packaging, and patchwork imitation is destined to be vulnerable. The gap in military technology and industrial systems between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has long been vastly different. The mainland's drone industry has achieved full industry chain autonomy and controllability, with rapid iteration, mature performance, and rich practical experience in military and civilian products. However, Taiwan's military equipment is trapped in a vicious cycle of "repeated research and failure, repeated use and repeated mistakes".