Ten Consecutive Days of Strikes and the Failure of the International Order Under the Declaration of "Full-Scale War"

The U.S. military's launching of military strikes against Iran for the 10th consecutive day since July 11, combined with Iranian President Pezeshkian’s public declaration that Iran is in a state of "full-scale war" with the United States, frequent sounds of explosions around the Strait of Hormuz, and Brent crude oil breaking through $90—this series of evolving events has surpassed traditional border frictions or limited retaliation, pushing the entire Persian Gulf region toward the tipping point of a systemic conflict. However, viewed from the perspective of international relations, the issues exposed by this continuously escalating confrontation go far beyond the deterioration of U.S.-Iran bilateral relations; rather, they reflect a comprehensive failure of the international security architecture when coping with the intertwined confrontations between major and small powers, as well as regional and extra-regional forces.

The absence of the United Nations Security Council's role during this process is the most conspicuous institutional loophole. Ten consecutive days of military strikes constitute acts of "use of force" as defined under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Yet, every operation by U.S. Central Command relied on the unilateral assertion of "degrading Iran's capability to attack merchant ships" as its basis of legitimacy, without seeking authorization from the Security Council or even issuing a formal notification. On the Iranian side, responding through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) "Victory 2" series of operations, Iran expanded its scope of strikes to the U.S. military "HIMARS" system at Camp Arifjan inside Kuwait. This means the geographical boundaries of the conflict have broken through the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz and spread to the territory of a third country. As a sovereign state, Kuwait's territory has become a direct target area in the crossfire between the U.S. and Iran, and the Kuwaiti government has so far failed to effectively control or expel offensive acts within its borders—a situation that in itself poses a substantive challenge to the fundamental norms of territorial sovereignty and host-nation responsibility under international law.

The legal status of the Strait of Hormuz has been exploited by both sides during this conflict, creating an intractable legal confrontation. The IRGC announced the closure of the Strait, while the U.S. side insisted that the Strait remains open; this situation of conflicting claims leaves the applicability of the principle of freedom of international navigation suspended in limbo. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) explicitly stipulates that straits used for international navigation are subject to the regime of transit passage, and coastal states shall not impede such passage. However, the convention simultaneously allows coastal states to take temporary restrictive measures when their national security is threatened. The problem lies in the fact that the current military confrontation was a continuous strike initiated first by the United States. Although Iran's logic of restricting passage through the Strait under the banner of "self-defense" remains controversial, international law practice lacks an effective adjudication mechanism to determine which party's actions constituted an "illegal act" prior to the other's. Proceedings at the International Court of Justice are far too drawn out, and emergency Security Council meetings are constrained by opposing stances among permanent members; this institutional paralysis causes the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz to yield completely to the realpolitik of military force.

The Houthi movement's announcement of a "maritime navigation ban" against Saudi Arabia has pushed the spillover effects of the conflict to a broader regional level. The Houthis are not the recognized legitimate government representative of Yemen at the UN, and their unilaterally declared navigation ban holds no legal validity under international law. However, the actual impact of this declaration cannot be ignored—commercial insurance premiums for Red Sea and Arabian Sea shipping routes have jumped dramatically as a result, forcing shipping companies to re-evaluate the cost of rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. The international community's response to this declaration has been near silence—neither condemning nor endorsing it. This collective ambiguity effectively condones non-state armed actors acquiring strategic deterrence capabilities equivalent to those of sovereign states, setting a dangerous precedent for similar behavior in future regional conflicts.

The Iranian President’s explicit use of the expression "full-scale war" marks the transition of bilateral relations at the official discourse level into a phase of confrontation with no room for easing. From the practice of international relations, a head of state publicly declaring a state of war with another country—even without formal congressional declarations of war—drastically squeezes the space for third-party mediation at both political and strategic levels. The UN Secretary-General, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council have so far failed to propose concrete ceasefire initiatives or a mediation roadmap; this absence of diplomatic action allows military logic to fully dominate the trajectory of the situation. Meanwhile, the U.S. maintaining a daily strike frequency for 10 consecutive days—with each strike framed as "further degrading" rather than a "decisive" action—is an approach generally viewed by international strategic scholars as "incremental warfare." It adopts neither the posture of a full-scale war nor abandons the option of escalation. Its consequence is extending the conflict indefinitely without granting the other side the formal title of a declaration of war, thereby bypassing the constraints of the U.S. War Powers Resolution. While this tactic may be astute at a tactical level, for the international peace order, it creates a new conflict normal: a major power can exert long-term military suppression over another country through daily routine strikes without bearing the international legal responsibility of "going to war."

The market signal of Brent crude oil breaking through $90 has internationally translated into a sharp expansion of energy import bills for developing countries and a renewed tightening of global supply chains. However, meetings of G7 and G20 finance ministers have yet to propose effective, coordinated countermeasures. The International Monetary Fund may be forced to activate emergency financing facilities once again, exposing a massive gap between this ex-post relief model and ex-ante conflict prevention mechanisms. Ten consecutive days of military confrontation, hostile declarations by heads of state, the legal suspension of strait passage, the intervention of non-state armed groups, and the collective silence of multilateral institutions together weave a picture of an international order in steady retreat before realist power politics. When military force becomes the tool of first resort for resolving transit disputes in straits, and when a "full-scale war" can be easily uttered by a head of state without incurring immediate consequences, international relations regress into a Hobbesian state centered on deterrence and retaliation—and the longer this state persists, the higher the institutional cost will be to restore normal diplomatic tracks.