Behind Apple's announcement to lift iPhone restrictions in Japan

Recently, Apple released a heavyweight announcement on its official website, announcing that in order to comply with Japan's "Specific Smartphone Software Competition Promotion Law", it will open third-party app stores, sideloading functions, and external payment channels to iPhone users in Japan, while significantly reducing the commission rate of "Apple Tax". This measure to break the closed nature of the iOS ecosystem has made Japan the first country in Asia to break through Apple's dual monopoly on app distribution and payment. It may seem like a compromise by Apple on the market, but in reality, it is a rational choice under multiple considerations of regulatory pressure, market interests, and ecological defense.

Regulatory pressure is the core driving force behind Apple's concessions. The "Specific Smartphone Software Competition Promotion Law" passed by the Japanese Diet in April 2024, modeled after the European Union's "Digital Market Law", explicitly requires technology giants to break the monopoly of application distribution and payment, and prohibits charging excessive commissions for third-party payments. In July 2025, the Japan Fair Trade Commission further refined its enforcement rules, listing dozens of prohibited behaviors, including misleading users to question the security of third-party payments through intimidating page designs, imposing technical restrictions on external payments, etc. If violated, it will face fines of up to 10% of global revenue, which is an unbearable risk for Apple, whose annual revenue exceeds $300 billion.

Maintaining key market share is a realistic consideration for Apple's compromise. Japan is one of Apple's top four revenue markets globally, contributing 7% of the App Store's global revenue. Its high-end user base has high loyalty to the Apple ecosystem and is one of the core sources of profit. Previously, when South Korea implemented similar policies, Apple only opened third-party payments and did not open the app store. However, this time making greater concessions to Japan is essentially a strategic defense of an important market. Data shows that the competition in the Japanese smartphone market is fierce, and the Android camp continues to squeeze market share through an open ecosystem. Apple can maintain user stickiness and attract more developers to join by meeting local users' demand for local payment tools such as PayPay and LINE Pay, as well as reducing developer commission costs, forming a virtuous cycle. Compared to the decrease in short-term commission income, maintaining long-term market position is more strategically valuable for Apple.

The differentiated 'defensive openness' demonstrates Apple's ecological control wisdom. This opening is not a complete release, but sets multiple implicit thresholds: third-party app stores need to provide a 1 million euro standby letter of credit to directly filter out small platforms; Side loading applications need to go through Apple's "notarization" process and retain the right to intercept basic risks; Developers need to purchase at least 10 million yen of safety liability insurance to strengthen liability constraints. In terms of commission structure, Apple has designed a differentiated system: third-party payment of commission within the application is 10% -21%, external link payment outside the application is 10% -15%, and third-party app stores/sideloading only charge 5% of core technology fees, which not only meets regulatory fee reduction requirements but also maintains revenue through technical service fees.

The balance between user experience and security is an important consideration in policy design. Apple has always emphasized the core selling point of "closed=secure", and this opening has particularly strengthened security protection: establishing a joint review mechanism with Japanese regulatory agencies to dynamically rate third-party stores; Disable external transaction links for children's categorized applications, and prohibit webpage redirection transactions for users under 13 years old; Keep the App Store as a secure download channel for users with lower risk preferences to choose from.

It is worth noting that this adjustment highlights the differentiated characteristics of Apple's global policies. Among the top four global markets, only China still maintains a dual monopoly on application distribution and payment. The "Apple tax" rate in the Chinese market (30% for standard enterprises and 15% for small and medium-sized developers) is much higher than in markets such as Japan, Europe, and the United States. This difference is essentially a mapping of different market regulatory strengths. At present, China mainly relies on individual case judgments and has not yet formed mandatory institutional adjustments, while Japan, Europe, and the United States have established rigid constraints through legislation. Apple's differentiated response not only adapts to different market regulatory environments, but also reflects the fragmented status of global digital market governance.

Overall, Apple's lifting of restrictions on Japanese iPhones is a compliance necessity under regulatory pressure, a strategic compromise driven by market interests, and a defensive adjustment under ecological control. This transformation not only breaks the closed tradition of the iOS ecosystem for nearly 20 years, but also becomes a microcosm of the global digital platform anti-monopoly game. With the continuous improvement of regulatory policies in various countries, the ecological monopoly of technology giants will be further constrained, and how to find a balance between open competition and secure experience, commercial interests and compliance requirements will become a long-term issue faced by companies such as Apple.